



Upjohn Institute Press 
 
 
The Optimal Pension 


















Chapter 5 (pp. 113-130) in: 
Imagining the Ideal Pension System: International Perspectives 
Dana M. Muir and John A. Turner, eds. 




Copyright ©2011. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 







W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /331778t
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Imagining the ideal pension system : international perspectives / Dana M. Muir, John 
A. Turner, editors.
  p. cm.
 “This book is based on the 2010 conference of the European Network for Research 
on Supplementary Pensions (ENRSP), held at the Economic Policy Institute in 
Washington, D.C., on September 10, 2010”—Foreword.
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-381-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-381-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-382-1 (hbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-382-0 (hbk. : alk. paper)
1. Pensions. I. Muir, Dana M., 1958- II. Turner, John A. (John Andrew), 1949 July 9- 





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /331778t
113
5
The Optimal Pension System
Is Denmark Best?
Finn Østrup
Center for Financial Law, Copenhagen Business School
In its report Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the 
Old and Promote Growth, the World Bank (1994) recommended that 
countries set up a multifaceted pension system based on three pillars:
1) a public old-age pension that covers the basic needs of older 
people,
2) mandatory pension plans that are fully funded, and
3) personal pension plans.
The Danish pension system closely resembles this type of system. 
A basic fl at-rate pension benefi t (social security benefi t) is provided to 
all residents in Denmark through the government budget. On top of 
this, persons are covered by labor market systems, which are negotiated 
between employees and employers at the level of the individual fi rm or 
profession. Third, persons may derive an income from tax-subsidized 
personal pension arrangements that can be established with banks and 
life insurance companies. 
This chapter fi rst discusses the main characteristics in the design 
of a pension system. It then discusses how the pension system affects 
a number of different policy objectives. The chapter fi nally turns to the 
Danish experience and describes some of the problems that have been 
encountered in this multifaceted pension system. A major fi nding from 
the chapter is that no universal formula can be found for an optimal 
pension system. The optimality of a national pension system depends 
on the goals that the pension system is supposed to achieve, which may 
vary between countries. Based on the Danish experience, it is shown 
that a multifaceted pension system such as that recommended by the 
World Bank may give rise to a range of problems. 
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POSSIBILITIES OF DESIGNING A PENSION SYSTEM
The main goal of pension systems is to provide a certain standard 
of living for people who no longer receive a labor income after a certain 
age. If people without a labor income are to maintain a certain standard 
of living, consumption possibilities must be transferred from people 
who are active in the labor market. This can take place in two ways. 
One possibility is to directly transfer money from employed people 
to pensioners. These types of payments take place in pay-as-you-go sys-
tems, which have various forms. A levy may, for example, be charged 
on individuals who are actively working, the proceeds of which are then 
used to fi nance benefi ts for pensioners. Payments can also be made by 
an enterprise to its former employees. A third possibility is that the retir-
ees receive benefi ts through the government budget. In pay-as-you-go 
systems, the criteria for the size of pensions may change. A person may, 
for example, receive a pension income that is determined as a certain 
percentage of the person’s fi nal salary in the fi rm in which he or she 
worked. People may also receive a fl at-rate pension, for example, one 
fi nanced through the government budget.
Pay-as-you-go plans are usually defi ned benefi t plans, implying 
that the amounts used to fi nance the pensions are determined by the 
size of benefi ts. Pay-as-you-go systems may, however, also be defi ned 
contribution plans. A government or an enterprise may, for example, set 
aside a certain sum that is then shared among the retirees. In practice, 
such a system has, however, not been implemented, possibly due to the 
large amount of uncertainty that would result with respect to the pen-
sion to be received by individual retirees.
Another possibility for organizing a pension system is that persons 
save for their old age while they are employed. The type of pension 
system is said to be prefunded. The saving can be managed either by the 
individual or it may be placed in an institution, for example, a pension 
fund or life insurance company. Pensions are later paid from the institu-
tion in which the saving was placed. 
A second way to classify pension systems is to consider the institu-
tional level at which the plans are organized. A broad distinction can be 
made between three institutional levels:
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1) pensions are organized at the individual level, implying that it 
is the decision of each individual how to provide for his or her 
living in old age;
2) pensions are organized at the level of an enterprise or collec-
tive group (e.g., employees in a certain sector or persons with 
a similar educational background), implying that it is left for 
enterprises or collective groups to organize pension plans; or
3) pensions are organized at the societal level, implying that pen-
sions are organized by, for example, the government, which 
establishes a universal pension system for all residents or for 
all persons who fulfi ll certain socioeconomic criteria. 
Classifying pension systems on the basis of these two criteria—on 
the basis of fi nancing (pay-as-you-go vs. prefunded) and institutional 
level at which pensions are organized (individual, enterprise/sector, and 
society)—we can derive six different ways to organize pension systems 
(Table 5.1). 
Examples of systems organized at the level of society based on 
pay-as-you-go fi nance include the public old-age pensions that are 
widespread in the United Kingdom and in the Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Norway, and Sweden). One example is the Danish basic old-
age pension, which is fi nanced through the government budget. The 
Danish government pays a basic pension benefi t to every person aged 
65 or older who has been a resident in Denmark for a certain minimum 
period. The benefi t is calculated based on criteria stipulated in legisla-
tion adopted by the Danish Parliament. All persons above the age of 65 
receive a uniform basic benefi t, but supplementary benefi ts are paid to 
people with low incomes. The general labor market system in Sweden 
is an example of society-wide systems that are based on prefunding. 
This system has been legislatively established and covers all employ-
ees. Employees are required to pay a certain percentage of their wage 
income to a pension fund that determines benefi ts based on the savings 
and accrued earnings. Examples of pension plans organized at the sec-
tor level with pay-as-you-go fi nancing are the various sector plans that 
constitute the basis of pension systems in Continental Europe (e.g., Bel-
gium, France, and Germany). Employees belonging to specifi c sectors 
pay contributions to a sector-wide plan that fi nances pensions out of its 
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revenue. Benefi ts are determined on the basis of the retiree’s previous 
labor income. 
As an example of prefunded pension systems organized at the level 
of the fi rm are those negotiated between fi rms and either single em-
ployees or labor unions. Such pension plans are common in Denmark. 
In many Danish enterprises, part of the company policy is that a certain 
percentage of the employee’s wage income is paid to an individual pen-
sion account in a pension fund or in a life insurance company, which 
manages the funds. The employee’s pension benefi t is subsequently 
calculated on the basis of past contributions and investment earnings. 
In most plans, the pension participant is guaranteed a minimum rate of 
return. For certain groups of employees, mostly in the public sector, 
pensions are part of a general wage agreement that is negotiated by 
a trade union on behalf of its members. Persons covered by the wage 
agreement make contributions to the pension fund, and pensions are 
determined on the basis of past contributions with accrued returns. The 
pension funds guarantee a certain minimum rate of return.
An example of pensions organized at the individual level with 
prefunding is personal pension plans established by individuals in life 
insurance companies or other pension institutions. The agreement en-
tered into between the individual and the pension institution stipulates 
that the policy holder is entitled to certain benefi ts after a specifi ed 
age either in the form of a lump sum or an annuity. In Denmark, tax-
subsidized personal pension plans are widespread. Pension savings can 
be undertaken not only in life insurance companies but also in banks.
System organization Pay-as-you-go fi nance     Prefunded fi nance
The society level  Public old-age pensions General systems fi nanced 
through taxes
The enterprise or 
sector level     
Pensions based on pension 
promises from fi rms
Pension systems for public 
servants fi nanced through 
the public budget
Sector systems with 
prefunded saving 
(pension funds, etc.) 
The individual level Old-age provision through 
family members
Individual pension 
savings (e.g., in life 
insurance companies)         
Table 5.1  Categories of Pension Systems
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Finally, pension plans organized at the individual level based on 
pay-as-you-go fi nancing include plans under which a group of people 
contribute to a retired person out of their income. Such pension pro-
vision is known in non-industrial societies. Family-based pensions, in 
which members of a family contribute to older family members, belong 
in this category.
POLICY OBJECTIVES IN DESIGNING A PENSION SYSTEM
The pension system serves or affects a range of goals, which are 
seen as valuable from the point of view of society in a variety of ways. 
Below we discuss how the pension system affects
• the desire to bring about a desired standard of living for persons 
who have retired from the labor market,
• the reduction of uncertainty concerning the postretirement 
standard of living,
• the level of national saving,
• the size of the labor force and the effi ciency of labor markets, 
and
• the effi ciency of fi nancial markets.
The Desired Standard of Living after Retirement 
Individuals have preferences with respect to the standard of living 
that they desire after retirement from the labor market. A main goal of 
pension arrangements is to bring about this desired standard of living. 
Complications arise in the design of a pension system because 
different conceptions exist, both among individuals and in society, con-
cerning the standard of living that pension systems should provide. Here 
we distinguish three possibilities. One possibility is that individuals 
may wish to achieve a certain level of consumption. After retirement, 
a person may, for example, desire to realize certain goals with respect 
to travel, the purchase of a holiday cottage, or providing other family 
members with gifts. In the case of such preferences, the goal of pension 
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systems should be to ensure that persons have acquired the fi nancial 
resources that make it possible to realize the desired level of consump-
tion during retirement. 
Another possibility is that people wish to maintain a certain stan-
dard of living relative to a reference group, for example, people with the 
same educational background or who have worked in the same sector or 
enterprise. They may also want to maintain a certain standard of living 
relative to the general standard of living in the population. 
Finally, a third possibility is that individuals may wish to maintain 
a certain standard of living relative to the standard of living that they 
enjoyed when they were active in the labor market, for example, with 
respect to housing or leisure activities. Some people may want to main-
tain the same standard of living, whereas others may accept limited 
downsizing. 
Individuals may have views regarding their postretirement standard 
of living that differ from the level that is regarded as reasonable from 
the perspective of society. From the point of view of society, it may, 
for example, be seen as unacceptable if older people have a standard 
of living that is markedly different from that which is enjoyed by the 
rest of the population. If the standard of living among older people falls 
markedly below that of the rest of the population, political pressures 
may build up to improve the living standard among the pensioners. It 
may also be seen as unacceptable from a societal point of view if pen-
sioners enjoy a living standard that is markedly above that of the rest 
of the population. In this case, political pressures may arise for making 
pensioners shoulder a larger part of the “societal” burden. 
If the goal of the pension system is to maintain a certain standard of 
living relative to other societal groups, it is preferable that the pension 
system be organized on a defi ned benefi t basis. Thus, in defi ned benefi t 
plans, pensions can be adjusted in such a way that individuals realize 
a certain standard of living relative to other groups. If defi ned benefi t 
plans are organized at the level of society, older people will normally 
receive a pension that makes it possible to maintain a certain standard 
of living relative to the rest of the population. The level of public old-
age benefi ts is often adjusted on the basis of the general wage level. In 
the case of defi ned benefi t plans organized at the level of an enterprise 
or a sector, the pension is often tied to the wages of people who cur-
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rently work in the enterprise or sector. In enterprise plans, pensioners 
may, for example, receive extra benefi ts if wages rise in the enterprise. 
In defi ned contribution plans, pensions depend on past savings and 
on the return that can be achieved on this saving. The return on invest-
ments may follow a development that is different from the development 
in wages. In defi ned contribution plans, it may therefore be diffi cult to 
realize a certain standard of living relative to the groups who are ac-
tive in the labor market. If, however, it is the goal to achieve a certain 
level of consumption in old age, defi ned contribution plans organized 
at the individual level may be seen as most desirable because this gives 
individuals the opportunity to adjust contributions in such a way that 
a certain sum will be available at a certain age. If the goal is to bring 
about a desired standard of living relative to other pensioners, it may 
be desirable to have defi ned contribution plans organized at the level 
of the group with which the individuals want to make comparisons. If, 
for example, the goal of economists is to maintain a certain living stan-
dard relative to other retired economists, it can be seen as appropriate if 
economists join together and organize their own pension plan. 
Reduction of Uncertainty in the Level of Pensions
A desirable goal of pension systems is to reduce the risks that are 
related to reaching a desired standard of living. Below we discuss the 
different risks that arise in different types of pension systems. Pension 
systems should be assessed in terms of the likelihood that these different 
risks will arise and of the weight that is attached to risk minimization. 
Pay-as-you-go pension systems
In pay-as-you-go pension plans organized at the enterprise level, 
pledges regarding the future level of pensions usually result from em-
ployment contracts. Enterprises are legally bound to keep these pledges. 
The fulfi llment of the pension pledge is conditioned on the survival of 
the enterprise. In the case of bankruptcy, the pension pledge will no 
longer be met. Pensions in pay-as-you-go plans organized at the enter-
prise level are therefore subjected to the risk that the company may go 
bankrupt.
In the case of pay-as-you-go plans organized at the societal or sec-
tor level, the level of pensions will depend on decisions made by those 
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who make the pension possible by agreeing to transfer consumption 
possibilities to the pensioners. At any time, contributors can change the 
rules of the game, thereby changing the size of the benefi ts. In a pub-
lic old-age system, for example, legislators may decide to change the 
level of pensions. In plans organized at the sector level, the employed 
members of the plan may fi nd that the economic burden related to con-
tributions is too big and decide on reductions in pensions. Legislative 
rules may make such changes at the sector level diffi cult or impossible, 
but legislators may also take the view that the burden related to pension 
contributions is too heavy and decide on changes in legislation that will 
make it possible to cut back on pensions. 
Various shifts in the economic or political environment may bring 
about situations that may either cause enterprises to go bankrupt, thus 
being unable to meet pension pledges in enterprise-based pension plans, 
or may lead to decisions about a reduction in the level of pensions in 
plans organized at the sector level or the level of society. An overview 
of different types of risk is found in Table 5.2.
One risk arising for pay-as-you-go pension systems is related 
to negative macroeconomic shocks that cause a lowering of wage 
incomes. It may be seen as “fair” if retirees share in these types of 
economic downturns. Thus, in the case that there is a reduction in after-
tax wage incomes caused by an economic downturn, it is likely that a 
decision will be made also to reduce pensions. Thus, the consumption 
possibilities for pensioners will be cut back in line with a reduction in 
the purchasing power that has taken place for wage earners. In the most 
extreme example, in pay-as-you-go systems organized at the enterprise 
level, negative macroeconomic shocks may lead to the bankruptcy of an 
enterprise, which will then be unable to meet pension pledges.
In addition to macroeconomic shocks, pay-as-you-go systems orga-
nized at the enterprise level or at the sector level are exposed to shifts 
in the demand for the product that is produced by the sector. A decline 
in demand may, for example, reduce the number of workers in a par-
ticular sector and thus make it more burdensome to fi nance pensions. 
One example is the fi nancial diffi culties experienced by pension sys-
tems that are organized for workers in coal or steel industries. A shift 
in the composition of demand may also bring about the bankruptcy of 
single enterprises. 
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Level of organization 
for the pension plan
Possibility of changing
the pension level Types of risk
Enterprise Bankruptcy risk Macroeconomic at the national level affecting the survival 
of the company
Sector-specifi c economic risks
Enterprise-specifi c economic risks
Demographic shifts
 Sector Change in underlying pension 
agreement
Macroeconomic risks related to changes in real wages 
(national level)
Sector-specifi c economic risks
Demographic shifts
Change in preferences regarding level of pension
 Society Change in legislation Macroeconomic risks related to changes in real wages 
(national level)
Demographic shifts
Change in preferences regarding level of pension
Table 5.2  Overview of Risks Related to Pension Plans Based on Pay-As-You-Go Finance
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Other factors also affect pay-as-you-go plans organized at the enter-
prise level. A fi rm may go bankrupt because of factors that are specifi c 
to the enterprise in question. There may, for example, be a reduction in 
the demand for the products produced by the particular fi rm. Ineffi cient 
management may also bring the enterprise down. 
For pay-as-you-go plans organized at the sector or society level, a 
further risk arises in connection with changes in the attitude toward the 
level of pension considered to be “fair.” Younger generations may not 
support the “generation pact” that implies they should support a certain 
living standard for older generations. 
Pay-as-you-go plans are also exposed to demographic shifts. If, for 
example, as a result of a reduction in the birth rate, there is a reduction 
in the number of younger people relative to older people, it will be more 
burdensome for the young to support a certain living standard for the 
old. In plans organized at the sector level or at the level of society, this 
may cause a decision to change the level of pensions. The same risk 
exists in plans organized at the enterprise level. A larger share of older 
people relative to workers means that the burden for the enterprise as-
sociated with the fi nancing of pensions will increase, increasing the risk 
that the enterprise may go bankrupt and thus be unable to meet pension 
pledges. 
Prefunded pension systems
Four types of risk arise with respect to the level of the pensions in 
prefunded pension systems: risks related to
1) fl uctuations in the return on the pension savings,
2) the sale of assets in the pension system,
3) political intervention that may change the standard of living of 
future pensioners, and
4) mismanagement of the pension arrangement. An overview is 
given in Table 5.3. 
Pension plans will be exposed to changes in the various economic
factors that may cause a reduction in the earnings of companies in 
which the pension plan has placed its investments, either in the form of 
equities or debt instruments (e.g., corporate bonds). In the case of equi-
ties, the pension arrangement will be exposed to the losses that occur in 
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Level of organization 
for the pension plan
Possibility of changing
the pension level Types of risk
Individual Changes in return on pension savings
Policy changes that reduce after-tax 
real income 
Macroeconomic risks which affect capital income 
(global level)
Change in preferences regarding level of pensions
Demographic shifts
Ineffi cient management of pension plan
Enterprise Changes in return on pension savings
Policy changes that reduce after-tax 
real income 
Macroeconomic risks which affect capital income 
(global level)
Change in preferences regarding level of pensions
Demographic shifts
Ineffi cient management of pension plan
Sector Changes in return on pension savings
Policy changes that reduce after-tax 
real income 
Macroeconomic risks which affect capital income 
(global level)
Change in preferences regarding level of pensions
Demographic shifts
Ineffi cient management of pension plan
Society Changes in return on pension savings
Policy changes that reduce after-tax 
real income 
Macroeconomic risks which affect capital income 
(global level)
Change in preferences regarding level of pensions
Demographic shifts
Ineffi cient management of pension plan
Table 5.3  Overview of Risks in Prefunded Pension Plans
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connection with a fall in earnings and thus also in the stock price. In the 
case that the pension plan invests in debt securities issued by compa-
nies, it will be exposed to the risk of bankruptcy in the enterprise. One 
may assume that pension plans will try to diversify their investments, 
including globally. This will cause the plans only to be exposed to the 
nondiversifi able (systemic) macroeconomic risks that occur in connec-
tion with changes in capital income at the global level. 
Pension plans will further be affected by the risk related to the 
sale of assets in the pension plan, which will depend on demographic 
shifts. At the time when pensioners need to use their pension savings 
for consumption, pensioners will have to sell assets (e.g., equities) in 
the pension plans. The purchasers of these assets will primarily be em-
ployed people. If there is a large number of retired older people relative 
to employed younger people, the outcome will be a fall in the price of 
the assets the pension plans want to sell. In this case, we may see a fall 
in share prices or in the price of fi xed property. This fall in asset prices 
will reduce the purchasing power of the older generation.
A third type of risk is that the performance of pension plans will 
be affected by political intervention. Several possible policy changes 
would benefi t the working generation. One is the pursuit of infl ationary 
macroeconomic policies, which will erode the real value of fi xed-
income assets in the pension plans. Another possibility is the taxation 
of the pension savings, either in the form of higher taxes on capital 
income in general or in the form of taxes levied specifi cally on pension 
savings. An exchange-rate policy directed toward a real depreciation 
of the domestic currency works to reduce the purchasing power of the 
older generation insofar as pension plans have invested in fi nancial as-
sets denominated in foreign currencies. A further policy intervention to 
reduce the purchasing power of the older generation is to raise prices on 
government services used by that generation, for example, fees related 
to health care or higher prices on medicine. 
Finally, policymakers can reduce the purchasing power of pensions 
through a low interest rate policy. The big losers from the pursuit of 
low interest rate policies pursued after 2001 and again since 2008 have 
been the pension savers who have experienced a large reduction in the 
return on their savings. It may be asked whether this policy would have 
been politically feasible if the saving had been undertaken by private 
individuals and not by pension institutions, which are distanced from 
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the savers and which the savers, due to a lack of transparency, fi nd it 
diffi cult to assess. 
Policy changes that reduce the after-tax real income of pensioners 
may be caused by shifts in preferences concerning the standard of liv-
ing for the older generation. Concepts with respect to what is regarded 
as a “fair” living standard may change. Policy changes aimed at lower-
ing real incomes for pensioners may also be caused by macroeconomic 
shifts that reduce real wages for the younger generation. One may fur-
ther expect the working generation to be less inclined to maintain the 
living standard of the old generation and thus more likely to undertake 
legislative changes that reduce the purchasing power of pensioners, if 
demographic shifts reduce the number of young people. 
An additional risk for prefunded pension plans arises in connection 
with ineffi cient management of the plan. In attempts to attract custom-
ers, managers of life insurance companies may, for example, promise 
pensions that are too high. A recent example of this is the British life 
insurer Equitable Life. Plans may also be managed by incompetent man-
agers who derive a low return on assets. The risk of mismanagement is 
exacerbated by corporate governance problems that arise particularly in 
relation to pension institutions. 
IS THE DANISH SYSTEM BEST?
As mentioned previously, the World Bank (1994) advocated a 
pension system based on three pillars. The basic idea is that the fi rst 
pillar—the mandatory public plan (social security)—will provide in-
dividuals with a guarantee of a minimum standard of living in old age. 
The goal of this fi rst pillar is to redistribute income toward those who 
have a need for additional income in old age. The goal of the second 
pillar—mandatory privately managed plans—is to shift income from 
the active working years to retirement years. According to the World 
Bank (1994, p. 9), this shall be done “avoiding perverse intragenera-
tional redistributions and unintended intergenerational redistributions.” 
The second pillar is further seen as promoting saving and as facilitat-
ing the development of fi nancial markets. Finally, the goal of the third 
126   Østrup
pillar—the voluntary personal or occupational plans—is to facilitate in-
dividuals’ efforts to achieve a higher income in old age.
Denmark has a pension system that closely resembles the system 
recommended by the World Bank. As its fi rst pillar, Denmark has a 
basic fl at-rate public pension (social security) that is tax fi nanced. This 
pension provides all residents with a basic income when they reach 
age 65, presently (2010) about €9,000, with a possibility of as much as 
about €18,000 if the individual has no additional income. In addition to 
this basic public old-age pension, nearly all Danish workers are covered 
by fully funded occupational systems in which benefi ts are determined 
on the basis of contributions and investment returns on pension sav-
ings. Finally, many Danish citizens have personal saving plans that are 
subsidized through the tax system and withdrawals can be made only 
after a certain age.
The question is, however, whether this organization of pensions is 
in fact the best system. In the discussion above, questions have been 
raised concerning some of the basic assumptions that underlie the rec-
ommendations in the World Bank report.
The main portion of pensions will, according to the World Bank 
recommendations, come from the mandatory fully funded private 
pension plans (the second pillar). A main argument against such fully
funded pension plans is that they provide less certainty concerning 
the living standard in old age than defi ned benefi t plans. Thus, in fully 
funded pension plans based on defi ned contributions, the size of pen-
sions depends on the share of production that goes to capital income. In 
contrast, under defi ned benefi t systems, it comes from development in 
wage incomes. Because the profi t share of capital income in production 
varies more than the wage share, fully funded pension plans based on 
past contributions will cause more uncertainty in terms of the standard 
of living in old age than will defi ned benefi t plans. This is a serious 
objection against such a pension system. After all, a major goal of a 
pension system is to provide individuals with a certain real income in 
old age.
It may be argued that the benefi t rate in defi ned benefi t plans is 
exposed to the uncertainty that results from the benefi t rate being deter-
mined in a political process in which decisions are made about a proper 
standard of living for the retirees. This is, however, also the case in 
defi ned contribution plans. Thus, the consumption possibilities for old 
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people under defi ned contribution plans are determined by decisions 
made concerning the taxation of pensions and capital income. Policy-
makers may also decide that pensioners will have to pay more for the 
services that they use. Working-age people may also reduce the living 
standard of the retirees through macroeconomic policies that may erode 
the purchasing power of saving (e.g., infl ation). Thus, defi ned contri-
bution plans are exposed to basically the same political uncertainty as 
defi ned benefi t plans. 
The case of Denmark demonstrates that fully funded plans, in addi-
tion to being subjected to economic uncertainty, are exposed to political 
uncertainty. Following lengthy political discussions, Denmark intro-
duced in 1982 a tax on the investment returns in pension plans. The 
goal was to reduce the real return in pension plans to reduce the real in-
come of future pensioners. It was widely argued that the high real return 
earned on funded pensions would lead to an unbalanced social situation 
in which an excessive share of national income would accrue to pen-
sioners. In recent years, there has been much discussion in Denmark on 
cutting back on the free services offered to wealthy pensioners through 
the government budget. In 1980, the Social-Democratic government 
had plans to force Danish pension funds and life insurance companies 
to earmark part of their investments to fi nance enterprises with a growth 
potential. Similar plans have recently (August 2010) been proposed by 
the current Liberal-Conservative government. The plan is to establish 
a fund fi nanced by pension institutions with the aim of providing fi -
nance for small- and medium-sized enterprises with a growth potential. 
In September 2010, at the height of the fi nancial crisis, the government 
initiated discussions with the pension institutions to encourage them to 
invest in and thus rescue problem banks. The plan was abandoned after 
resistance from the pension industry. 
These different examples show that the existence of a large pool of 
savings in pension institutions represents a temptation for policymak-
ers. They may want to use the funds for purposes that, for political or 
fi nancial reasons, are diffi cult to pursue through the government budget. 
These episodes raise doubt whether it is possible to effi ciently manage 
the savings in prefunded pension plans. 
Another basic objection to fully funded pension plans with defi ned 
contribution benefi ts is that such plans are unable to provide pension-
ers with a desired standard of living relative to the working population. 
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Thus, if the goal of a pension system is to provide pensioners with a cer-
tain living standard relative to the rest of the population, funded defi ned 
contribution pension plans can be seen as inferior relative to defi ned 
benefi t plans in which explicit political decisions are made regarding 
the proper living standard for pensioners.
During the recent decade, interest rates have fallen to very low 
levels. The prefunded Danish plans are guaranteed so that the rate of re-
turn cannot fall below a set minimum rate. For plans established before 
1994, the promised minimum rate of return was 4.5 percent. It was then 
lowered to 2.5 percent, and for plans established since 1999, the rate 
has been 1.5 percent. Due to the low interest rates that have prevailed 
during the past decade, the Danish pension industry wants to abolish 
the minimum rate guarantees. This has met with fi erce resistance from 
many of the members. One argument is that the pension institutions 
will evolve into mutual funds with some cover against life risk if the 
minimum return guarantees are abolished. 
A basic challenge for pension systems is to handle a future larger 
share of older people in the population. This implies that funded pension 
plans will have to sell their assets to a shrinking share of working-age 
people, which would result in downward pressure on asset prices, for 
example, a fall in prices of shares and of long-term fi xed-rate bonds. 
The implication is that the losers in the intergenerational confl ict over 
resources will be the future pensioners who will experience a fall in 
the value of their investments. Seen from the perspective of securing 
pensioners a certain living standard, fully funded pension plans can be 
viewed as especially defi cient in situations in which there is a rising 
share of older people in the population. 
To some extent, pension plans can dispose of assets that can be 
used immediately for consumption without the need to effectuate sales 
in markets. Pension plans may, for example, hold bank deposits or debt 
securities that mature at the time when proceeds are needed for pen-
sion payments. In this case, the outcome could be infl ation because the 
pensioners are competing with workers to lay hold of production for 
consumption. An upward price pressure may be expected in particular 
on goods and services that are used by older people, for example, health 
services and medicine. If the monetary authorities in this type of situa-
tion try to maintain price stability through a strict monetary policy, the 
outcome will be a rise in unemployment. In this case, the losers in the 
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intergenerational confl ict will be workers who face a higher unemploy-
ment risk. If the monetary authorities allow infl ation to take place, the 
losers will be pensioners who see the real value of their assets dimin-
ished. In either case, social tensions are to be expected.
Similarly, a reduction in a country’s production resulting from 
a smaller labor force will imply an upward pressure on prices of the 
national production, implying that the country will experience a real ap-
preciation and thus a reduction in the purchasing power of pensioners, 
as discussed above. 
The World Bank report stresses the positive effects on saving as a 
point in favor of mandatory defi ned contribution–funded pension plans. 
It is, however, uncertain to what extent funded pension plans increase 
saving. In spite of the expansion of prefunded pension plans, Denmark 
has one of the lowest household saving rates among the industrialized 
countries. The same is true in the United States and the United King-
dom. As argued above, prefunded plans organized at the society level or 
at the sector level may harm saving because they lack transparency and 
thus make it diffi cult for households to make correct decisions concern-
ing saving. Surveys regarding the saving behavior of Danish households 
show that there are considerable differences between households with 
the same age and income regarding saving behavior (see Hansen, 
Meding, and Østrup 2009). A large number of people in their fi fties 
have no savings except for that in their pension plans. This seems to 
confi rm that it may be particularly diffi cult to make informed savings 
decisions with prefunded plans. 
The World Bank report fi nally views funded pension plans as a posi-
tive contribution to the development of fi nancial markets. It is, however, 
uncertain to what extent this is the case. If pension plans diversify in-
ternationally, they will not help to develop domestic fi nancial markets, 
and the experience from Denmark shows that pension institutions are 
increasingly diversifying internationally. Furthermore, it seems reason-
able to ask whether the goal of high saving could not be reached more 
suitably through a strict fi scal policy that creates a budgetary surplus or 
through credit restrictions that make it more diffi cult to take out positive 
equity in houses.
A wider choice of fi nancial instruments may, on one hand, be seen 
as positive as it may help the diversifi cation of risk and alleviate the 
fi nancing of investments. The recent fi nancial crisis has, however, dem-
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onstrated that a wider choice of fi nancial instruments also works to 
reduce transparency and encourage excessive risk taking. 
CONCLUSIONS
Contrary to the recommendations of the World Bank, we conclude 
that no universal formula can be found for an optimal pension system. 
The optimality of a pension system should be seen in the light of the 
goals that the pension system is supposed to pursue. While the main 
goal of a pension system is to provide persons with a desired stan-
dard of living after retirement, the pension system affects, however, 
a number of other policy goals, for example, the labor supply and the 
effi ciency of fi nancial markets. The optimality of a pension system 
depends on the extent to which the pension system meets this range 
of policy goals. Because policy goals may differ among countries and 
change over time, no universal answer can be derived as to what is the 
optimal pension system. The Danish experience with a pension system 
that closely resembles the recommendations in the World Bank report is 
not unambiguously positive. Among industrial countries, Denmark has, 
for example, experienced one of the lowest saving rates for households. 
The accumulation of savings in pension institutions has acted as an in-
vitation to political intervention through which changing governments 
have sought to use the pension saving for purposes that are unrelated to 
securing the living standard of older people. Moreover, a main topic of 
discussion in Denmark has been the complexity of the pension system, 
which has caused a lack of transparency. 
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